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I KNOW YOU'RE THE GOVERNMENT'S LAWYER, BUT
ARE YOU MY LAWYER TOO? AN EXPLORATION OF
THE FEDERAL-NATIVE AMERICAN TRUST
RELATIONSHIP AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
David I. Gold
I. INTRODUCTION
While present at a Dartmouth College symposium on
federal Indian law, Governor James Sappier of the Penobscot
Nation posed the following question to Ralph Tarr, then Solicitor
of the Department of the Interior:1
Governor Sappier: I know you're the
government's lawyer. Are you my lawyer?2
Solicitor Tarr: When our interests are
congruent, when I can look at what we're
doing, we being the federal government, as
being in line with what we think is in the best
interest of the tribes, then I'm your lawyer
too. When we disagree, when there is an
incongruence between what we've identified
as what the feds want to do and what we think
the tribes want to do, then you'd better get
your own lawyer.3
Hence, when Federal and Native American interests collide, the
result is an apparent irreconcilable breakdown of the 150 year-old
Federal-Native American trust relationship.
I See G. William Rice et al., Federal Trust Responsibility and Conflicts
of Interest: Environmental Protection or Natural Resource Development?, 71
N.D. L. REV. 365, 378 (1995).
2 Id. at 378.
3 Id. at 378-79.
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The above being said, this article will explore why the
Federal-Native American trust relationship is so easily dissipated
in conflict of interest situations. In doing so, Part II of this article
will investigate the nature of the Federal-Native American trust
relationship from its historical underpinnings in Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia4 to its enigmatic state leading up to Nevada v. United
States.' Next, Part III will discuss Nevada, and the problems
attributable to the Supreme Court's holding in that case. Part IV
will then consider past proposals aimed at rectifying the federal
conflict of interest problem, and why this author believes such
solutions are unworkable. Finally, Part V will articulate what this
author believes to be the most appropriate answer to the federal
conflict of interest dilemma-a modification of the traditional
Federal-Native American trust relationship in favor of a litigation
policy aimed at self-sufficiency and autonomy.
II. THE NATURE OF THE FEDERAL-NATIVE AMERICAN
TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Since its holding in Cherokee Nation,6 the United States
Supreme Court has forged much of the federal law applicable to
the Native American tribes.7 While "the Court has not always been
especially active in Indian cases, its pronouncements have served
as the cornerstones for American law and policy towards the Indian
nations."8 Therefore, it is only appropriate that this article begin its
survey of the Federal-Native American trust relationship with a
consideration of Cherokee Nation, a case that many believe laid the
groundwork for all future cases concerning the Federal-Native
American trust relationship.
4 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
5 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
6 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
7 See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize
Federal Indian Control Lw, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 899, 943 (1998).
8 T.f
Federal-Native American
A. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia9
Cherokee Nation "arose out of a suit filed by the Cherokee
tribe... in which the tribe sought to enjoin enforcement of state
statutes that gave Georgia jurisdiction over persons residing on
[Cherokee] land."1  In evaluating the Cherokee claims, the
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Cherokee nation
constituted "a foreign state in the sense of the [United States]
Constitution,"" thereby entitling it to original Supreme Court
jurisdiction under Article 3, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution. 2 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
John Marshall, held that it did not. 3 However, more importantly,
the Supreme noted that while the Cherokee nation did not
constitute a foreign state in the constitutional sense, it did
constitute "a domestic dependent nation." 4 Thus, according to
Chief Justice Marshall, the Cherokee nation's relationship with the
federal government "resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian."'5
Cherokee Nation must be thought of as the foundational
statement with respect to the Federal-Native American trust
relationship. However, as with any foundation, the principles
enunciated in Cherokee Nation are only as strong as the cases that
follow it. Accordingly, the remainder of this section will provide a
brief historical overview of the growth of the trust doctrine
following Cherokee Nation and leading up to Nevada v. United
States.1
6
9 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
10 Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARv.
L. REV. 422,423 (1984).
11 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
12 See U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2.
13 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20.
14 " Id. at 17.
15.. ; Id.
16 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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B. From Cherokee Nation to Nevada
1. Worcester v. Georgia.7
In Worcester, the Supreme Court examined the
"protectorate" 8 style relationship that the United States developed
with the Cherokee people during the early half of the Nineteenth
Century. In doing so, the Court concluded that while the Cherokee
remained "a distinct community occupying [their] own territory,"' 9
they did so as a nation "claiming and receiving the protection of
one more powerful,"2 the United States. Therefore, with the
promulgation of Worcester, the "domestic dependent,"'
"protectorate ' 22 rationale espoused in Cherokee Nation23 was
solidified as the Federal-Native American trust relationship took
shape.
2. Post-Worcester: The Nineteenth Century
"Over the course of the nineteenth Century . . . the
[Federal-Native American trust relationship] theory evolved from
the Marshallian ideal of protection to a justification for the exercise
of federal power.", 24 For instance, in United States v. Kagama,
25
and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,26 the full power of the federal
government came to bear on Native Americans who were said to
7 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
18 Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust
Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources,
71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 330 (1995).
19 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
20 Id. at 555.
21 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
22 Royster, supra note 18, at 330.
23 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16-17.
24 Royster, supra note 18, at 330 (citing Milner S. Ball, Constitution,
Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 63 (1987)).
25 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
26 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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need the "care and protection" of the federal government with
respect to tribal government authority and lands.27
During this period, the Supreme Court refused to intercede
at times when the federal government chose to: a) "subject Indians
to federal criminal laws;"'28 or b) "take tribal lands for
homesteaders in violation of express treaty provisions." 9 Rather,
the "domestic dependent ' 3" status of Native Americans, based on a
theory of manifest destiny, provided an absolute justification for
the quashing of Native American rights. Accordingly, post-
Worcester cases during the nineteenth century could be
characterized as examples of the unrestricted power wielded by the
federal government over Native Americans in the name of
dependency.
3. Post-Worcester: The Twentieth Century
"Over the course of the twentieth century, the symbiotic
relationship between the guardianship principles and federal
plenary power underwent a second significant change."' Whereas
in the nineteenth century federal power over Native Americans was
nearly absolute; in the twentieth century the Supreme Court began
to enforce the federal trust responsibility toward Native Americans
as it applied to the executive branch of the federal government.32
"As one indicator of this change, the Court repudiated many of the
most destructive aspects of the plenary power doctrine."33 For
instance, in Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa,34 the Court held that the
27 Royster, supra note 18, at 330 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 564 (1903) and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)).
29 Id. at 330 (citing Kagamna, 118 U.S. at 383).
29 Id. at 330 (citing Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554-60).
30 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
31 Royster, supra note 18, at 331.
32 See William C. Canby, Jr., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL at
38 (West, 3r Ed. 1998). See also Royster, supra note 18, at 331 (citing Nell
Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 231-33 (1984)).
33 Royster, supra note 18, at 331.
3,4 249 U.S. 110 (1919).
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Secretary of the Interior could not dispose of lands claimed by a
Native American tribe in the same manner in which it disposed of
general public lands.35 And, in Cramer v. United States,36 the
Supreme Court affirmatively sought to protect Indian-occupied
lands from third-party confiscation by way of federal land patent.37
Consequently, as the Supreme Court began to curb the executive
branch's plenary power over Native Americans during the
twentieth century, this period could be regarded as a time in which
the "[g]overnment was [thought to be] more than 'a mere
contracting party [with Native Americans];' [but rather] was to 'be
judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.' 38
4. Post-Worcester: Questions Remain
Notwithstanding the above, it is not surprising that
questions arose concerning exactly what the Supreme Court meant
when it stated that the Government should be judged by "the most
exacting fiduciary standards."'39 "Although the Cherokee cases
appear to have recognized the existence of certain fiduciary
obligations, th[ose] cases offered no explanation or elaboration of
[such standards]." '4  Furthermore, while a plethora of cases
concerning the government's fiduciary responsibility towards
Native Americans came to be heard during the twentieth century,4'
none of them answered the basic question: Should the law of
private trusts be applied to the Government in its capacity as
35 See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919).
36 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
37 See Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923).
38 Canby, Jr., supra note 32, at 39 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United
States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942)). See also United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (holding that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a
common-law trust are present" as it pertains to the relationship between the
Secretary of the Interior and federally managed Indian forest lands).
39 Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97.
40 Note, supra note 10, at 429.
41 See Canby, Jr., supra note 32, at 41 (discussing how "[s]everal lower
courts have invoked the trust responsibility to compel the government to
undertake litigation to protect tribal lands or resources.").
Federal-Native American
Federal-Native American trustee?42  Accordingly, when the
Supreme Court heard arguments in 1983 in Nevada v. United
States,43 the stage was set for it to determine exactly what was
meant when it previously stated that the government should be
judged by "the most exacting fiduciary standards'" in terms of its
relationship with the Native American tribes.
I. NEVADA V. UNITED STATES45
A. Background
In Nevada, the federal government sought to litigate a
longstanding dispute concerning the ownership of water rights
associated with the Truckee River. 6 Water claims were originally
brought in 1913 on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation
and the Newlands Reclamation Project,47 and in 1944, all of the
original claims were thought to be settled.48 Nevertheless, in 1973,
the federal government brought suit once again in favor of the
Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, asserting additional water rights
on its behalf.
49
While the government's opponents raised the time-honored
doctrine of res judicata as a defense, the government responded
that:
[B]ecause it had represented both the
[Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation] and the
[Newlands Reclamation Project] in the
[original] litigation, there was no adversity of
42 At most, Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 444-45 (1912),
established in dicta that the trust relationship in general is not "circumscribed by
rules which govern private relations." However, the force of such language is
subject to broad interpretation. See Part II of this Article, infra.
43 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-97.
45 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
46 See id.
47 See id. at 113.
48 See id. at 118.
49 See id. at 113.
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interest between the claimants, and [as such],
the [1944 settlement] could not be binding as
between the [Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation] and the [Newlands Reclamation
Project]."
Therefore, what began as a simple water fights dispute now
blossomed into a precedent-setting case in which the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether "the federal conflict of interest
[described above] obviated the necessary adversity [required for
the defense of res judicata]."'
B. Holding
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by then-
Associate Justice William Rehnquist, held that it did not. 2
According to the Court, "[n]ot only had the federal government
pleaded the claimant's interests separately, but the reclamation
interests had also been represented after 1926 by the local
irrigation district." 3 Furthermore, the Court noted that:
[While t]he United States undoubtedly owe[d]
a strong fiduciary duty to its Indian wards...
r,1 where Congress has imposed upon the
United States, in addition to its duty to
represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water
rights for reclamation projects, and has even
authorized the inclusion of reservation lands
within a project, the analogy of a faithless
50 Royster, supra note 18, at 351 (citing Nevada, 463 U.S. at 137-39).
See also Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n.15 (discussing the argument that because
"the Government's primary interest in Orr Ditch was to obtain water rights for
the Newlands Reclamation Project .. . by definition any rights given to the
[Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation] would conflict with that interest.").
51 Royster, supra note 18, at 351.
52 See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n. 15.
53 Royster, supra note 18, at 351 (citing Nevada, 463 U.S. at 140).
Federal-Native American
private fiduciary cannot be controlling for
purposes of evaluating the authority of the
United States to represent different interests. 4
Consequently, in Nevada, the Supreme Court established that
simply because the government is charged with more than one
responsibility (i.e., a conflict of interest"), does not mean that such
conduct constitutes a breach of the Federal-Native American trust
relationship on the part of the government. Rather, "[tihe Court
found it 'simply unrealistic' that the government could not, as
required by Congress, represent both interests adequately."56
C. Problems With Nevada
While it is generally true that the federal executive is held
to a strict standard of compliance with respect to fiduciary duties,57
the Nevada Court specifically noted that such a premise is true
only if the executive is not otherwise directed by Congress. 8 As
54 Nevada, 463 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added).
55 Such a conflict of interest arose as a result of the federal government's
required concurrent representation of both the Newlands Reclamation Project
and the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation despite the fact that each party had
obviously competing interests. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 113. See also the
Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 stat. 388 (1902) (current version at 43
U.S.C. §§ 372-73, 383, 391-92, 411,416,419,421,431-32,434,439,461,491,
498), and Part II of this Article, infra. However, such conflicts of interest are
not unique to Nevada, as Part II(C)(1) of this Article, infra, explains.
56 Royster, supra note 18, at 351 (citing Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128). See
also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 627 (1983).
5 See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native
Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands
and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 114-15 (1995) (noting that "[w]hen
faced.with Indian trust law issues, courts instinctively gravitate toward private
trust law, a body of jurisprudence which has engendered a generous set of
standards by which to assess private fiduciary conduct.").
58 See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 128 (stating that "it may well appear that
Congress was requiring the Secretary of the Interior to carry water on at least
two shoulders when it delegated to him both the responsibility for the
supervision of the Indian tribes and the commencement of reclamation projects
in areas adjacent to reservation lands. But Congress chose to do this [.]").
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such, the Nevada decision-which allows the government to
represent both Native Americans and third party/government
interests simultaneously--appears to fly in the face of both
common sense and established principles concerning conflicts of
interest.
1. Inherent Conflicts of Interest Within the Federal
Bureaucracy
"If the United States maintains a trust relationship with
Indian Nations, then, when the United States pursues its own
interests to the detriment of Indian Nations, does this violate the
trust relationship?" 9 According to Nevada, the answer is no. This
is the case despite the fact that it is readily apparent that "[b]ureaus
within the federal government have conflicting responsibilities in
relation to [the] trust function, with [different branches] look[ing]
out for Indian interests [and] others look[ing] out for the interests
of the United States population as a whole."60  For instance,
consider the following example:
In 1970 the Bureau of Land Management
(B.L.M.) agreed to lease a tract of public
lands for 99 years to the state of Arizona for
airport and public park facilities. This tract
bordered an Indian reservation and the tribe
on that reservation claimed that it owned and
used part of the tract which B.L.M. was going
to lease as public lands. The tribe complained
that the land was not recognized as theirs only
because of a surveying error made 50 years
ago. The tribe objected to the lease and
demanded that the land be returned to them.
B.L.M. refused so the dispute went to the
Secretary of the Interior for a settlement. The
59 Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of
Native American Indian Nations, 76 U. DEr. L. Rv. 745, 782-83 (1999).
60 Id. at 783.
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Secretary decided to allow B.L.M. to lease the
land despite the objection of the Indian tribe.
In making his decision the Secretary was
arbitrating a dispute between two of his
"clients"--the B.L.M., for whose actions he
was responsible under the law, and the Indian
tribe, to which he owed a trust duty under the
law to protect its lands and rights. The duty
to Indians obligated the Secretary of the
Interior to diligently pursue all reasonable
claims on their behalf.
In this example the Indian tribe and
B.L.M. had competing interests in the same
tract of land and in these circumstances the
Secretary of the Interior could not fulfill his
trust obligation to the tribe. Legally, he could
not even consider the position of the B.L.M.
and still comply with the required standards
of utmost loyalty to Indians and good faith to
their interests. Thus he had a conflict of
interest in a situation where he was deciding
the use and ownership of Indian lands.61
While a "private attorney could not ethically undertake the
representation of such clearly competing clients, [ ] government
attorneys regularly do."'62 And, while "[tiheoretically, the existence
of such competitive interests means that all sides of an issue are
heard[,] and [that] the final policy decision reflects a measured
policy judgment in the public interest[,]" '63 it is still important to
61 Gilbert L. Hall, THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP at 31-32
(Institute for the Development of Indian Law, 1979).
62 Canby, Jr., supra note 32, at 50.
63 Hall, supra note 61, at 31. See also Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n.15
(focusing on the district court's fimding that conflict of interest issues are
resolved within the executive branch of government by top-level executive
officers who are charged with the responsibility of making ultimate political and
policy decisions.).
2000-2001
BUFFALO PUBLIC INTEREST LAW JOURNAL VOL. XIX
remember that "substantial political pressure [and outside
economic pressure] can frequently be applied [to] executive
[branch] officials [in an effort] to compromise or ignore Indian
rights."'  Accordingly, this author would submit that the Supreme
Court's position in Nevada, which focuses on a perceived orderly
and hierarchical decision making process within the executive
branch, free of any outside interference or influences," is fanciful
at best.
2. Compromising Established Ethical Principles
Additionally, it is important to note that the Nevada
decision appears to make compromises with respect to established
ethical principles concerning conflicts of interest and the duty of
loyalty. For instance, while A.B.A. Model Rule 1.7,66 Ethical
64 Felix S. Cohen, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at 228 (Michie,
1982 Ed. 1982) (emphasis added). See also Wood, supra note 57, at 116.
65 See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135 n. 15. See also Rice et al., supra note 1, at
373 (interpreting Nevada as holding that "the Court will look to the question of
whether procedurally the United States has tried to separate out its various
interests and zealously and separately represent the Indian interest within a
decision-making process, often taking place possibly wholly within the
Department of the Interior.").
6 A.B.A. Model Rule 1.7 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly
adverse 'o another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyers own
interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely
affected; and
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Considerations 5-14 and 5-15 of the A.B.A. Model Code,67 and the
A.B.A.'s Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers68 take strong
positions against potential conflicts of interest, the arrangement
promulgated in Nevada seems to ignore such important
(2) the client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter in undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of
the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks
involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (As Amended February
1999).
67 A.B.A. Model Code-Ethical Consideration 5-14 states:
Maintaining the independence of professional
judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance
or continuation of employment that will adversely
affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to
a client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is
asked to represent two or more clients who may have
differing interests, whether such interests be
conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise
discordant.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (As Amended 1983).
A.B.A. Model Code-Ethical Consideration 5-15 states in pertinent
part that:
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple
clients with differing interests; and there are few
situations in which he would be justified in
representing in litigation multiple clients with
potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted
such employment and the interests did become actually
differing, he would have to withdraw from
employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on
the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he
refuse the employment initially.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (As
Amended 1983) (emphasis added).
68 See generally RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 201-16
(Draft April 1998).
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judgments.69  Accordingly, this author would ask whether the
"less-than-satisfactory advocacy ' 70 system approved of in Nevada
should trump established and universally accepted 7' ethical
standards simply because the primary interests involved are Native
American.
3. Inadequate Compensation for Breach
69 In fact, even if a tribe sought to intervene in litigation due to an actual
or potential governmental conflict of interest, such a procedure must still be
approved by the two most likely conflicted parties to begin with, the Secretary
of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. See Tracy N. Zlock, The
Native American Tribe as a Client, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 159, 178 (1996)
(citing 25 U.S.C.A §§ 81-82).
7C Canby, Jr., supra note 32, at 38.
71 According to Professors Richard C. Wydick and Rex R. Perschbacher:
In 1969, the American Bar Association
promulgated the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (the "ABA Code") as a model for the
various states to follow in adopting their own sets of
legal ethics rules. It was widely accepted, and within a
few years almost all of the states had adopted ethics
rules patterned closely on the ABA Code.
In 1977, the ABA began work on the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules").
The ABA Rules were designed to replace the Model
Code-that is, to become a new model for the states to
follow. After extensive debate and a long process of
compromise and amendment, a final version of the
ABA Model Rules was adopted by the ABA House of
delegates in 1983.
The ABA Model Rules did not receive the quick,
warm reception that the states had given the ABA
Code fourteen years earlier[.] [However, a]s of 1996,
thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have
adopted new legal ethics rules patterned on the ABA
Model Rules . . . , and [a] few other states have
recently revised their legal ethics rules, drawing partly
on the ABA Model Rules for guidance. [Finally, t]he
remaining states have thus far elected to retain their
own rules patterned on the ABA Code.
Richard C. Wydick and Rex R. Perschbacher, CALIFORNIA LEGAL ETHICS at 43-
44 (West, 2d. Ed. 1997).
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Finally, yet no less importantly, problems exist with the
Nevada Court's oversimplified insistence that should the
Government fail in its obligations towards a tribe, then that tribe
has a remedy for breach of duty against the government.72 While it
only seems fair to "offer tribes the promise of a breach of trust
action [should] the... Government fail to properly represent tribal
interests[,] ... damages in breach are not water rights,"'73 nor are
they mineral rights, nor could they ever hope to compensate for
lands passed on for hundreds, if not thousands of years, from one
generation to the next. Therefore, this author would submit that
while monetary remedies for breach of fiduciary duties are
appropriate in other circumstances, they are simply unsatisfactory
in the Federal-Native American trust situation.
IV. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES AIMED AT
RECTIFYING THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROBLEM
When considering the historical developments above, it is
important to note that during the 1970's two alternative proposals
were offered as potential remedies to the conflict of interest
dilemma.74 While neither was enacted,75 both proposals served as a
call to action with respect to the conflict of interest problem.
Consequently, a brief description of each, and a review of their
feasibility, follows.
A. The Indian Trust Counsel Authority
72 See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 144 n.16 (majority opinion), and see also
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., concurring).
73 Royster, supra note 18, at 353.
74 See President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on
Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970) (proposing an Indian Trust Counsel Authority),
and AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT (1976) (proposing a cabinet level Department of Indian Affairs with its
own Office of Trust Rights Protection).
75 See Canby, Jr., supra note 32, at 52.
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In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon "proposed the
establishment of an independent Indian Trust Counsel Authority
that would undertake legal representation of Indian trust
interests., '71 "The Trust Counsel Authority proposal would have
created an independent legal authority which would [have brought]
lawsuits on behalf of the United States government as trustee. 77
Additionally, the Trust Counsel Authority would have been
governed by a three-person board of directors (appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate),78 with at least
two of those directors required to be Native American. 7 9 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, under the Trust Counsel Authority,
the United States would have been required to waive its sovereign
immunity from suit in connection with Authority led litigation.0
Thus, the proposal would have created a governmental entity free
to litigate Native American claims, unfettered by conflict of
interest issues. Nevertheless, despite the need for such a proposal,
the Trust Counsel Authority idea was never implemented because
it was seen by government bureaucrats as "relieving the Justice
Department of its [widespread] responsibility."'"
B. The American Indian Policy Review Commission
Following on the heals of President Nixon's proposed Trust
Counsel Authority, "Senator James Abourezk introduced Senate
Joint Resolution No. 133 [in 1973] to establish a Federal
76 Id. at 51 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 23258, 23261 (1970)).
77 National Congress of American Indians, Discussion Paper for National
Tribal Leaders' Meetings (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<.http:i/www.halcyon.condpub/fwdp/resolutions/cai993.txt> (discussing the
historical development of Nixon's proposed Trust Counsel Authority).
78 See President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on
Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970).
79 See id.
8o See id.
81 National Congress of American Indians, Discussion Paper for National
Tribal Leaders' Meetings (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<http://www.halcyon.com/pub/fwdp/resolutions/ncai1993.txt> (discussing the
historical development of Nixon's proposed Trust Counsel Authority).
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commission to review all aspects of policy, law, and administration
relating to affairs of the United States with American Indian tribes
and people."82 Thereafter, on January 2, 1975, the Resolution 3
was signed into law by the President,84 and the American Indian
Policy Review Commission was established.
The Commission, which delivered its report to the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1977,86 "boasted [that] it
was the first such panel 'to listen attentively to the voice of the
Indian rather than the Indian expert."'87  Furthermore, while
numerous suggestions were proposed by the Commission, perhaps
the most important, for the purposes of this Article, came in the
form of the Commission's recommendation that "a cabinet level
Department of Indian Affairs with its own Office of Trust Rights
Protection [be established] to litigate trust cases." 8 Such an entity,
much like Nixon's Trust Counsel Authority, 9 would have
"operated independently of the Bureau of Indian Affairs," '9 and
would not have been "burdened by that agency's tangled history
with [the] tribes."91  Nevertheless, despite these important and
necessary features, the Interior Department refused to relinquish its
authority over the tribes,92 the proposed cabinet level plan was
soon abandoned, and any hopes of rectifying the Federal-Native
American trust conflict of interest problem were effectively
shelved.
82 United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs-History Web-Page
(visited April 1, 2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-scia/cominfo.htm>.
83 S.J. Res. 133, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
8 See id. (enacted).
85 See United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs-History Web-
Page (visited April 1, 2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-scia/cominfo.htm>.
h6 See id.
87 David Lightman and Daniel P. Jones, Recognition: Tangled Path
Through Bureaucracy Can Lead Tribes to a Source of Renewal, THE HARTFORD
COURANT, May 24, 1994, at Al.
88 Canby, Jr., supra note 32, at 51-52.
89 See Part IV(A) of this Article, supra.
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C. Feasibility of the Two Previously Proposed Alternatives
While many believe that the problems associated with
Nevada93 might never have become an issue had either of the two
previously discussed proposals been enacted, others note a sincere
lack of confidence in the ability of either proposal to affect
Nevada-like cases.94 The former belief, prompted by the notion
that a Trust Counsel Authority or cabinet level Department of
Indian Affairs would be the end-all-and-be-all with respect to
Nevada-like issues, is, in this author's mind, clearly idealistic. By
contrast, the latter belief, supported by a realization that sheer
resources 95 may readily determine one's ability to litigate
successfully,96 appears to hit the mark.
While it is true that the proposed Trust Counsel Authority
or cabinet level Department of Indian Affairs would have been
independent, it still would have been required to compete in court
with powerful adversaries such as the Department of Justice and
the Department of the Interior.97 Furthermore, given the present
era of pervasive governmental budgetary restraints, it is not
difficult to surmise that each proposed entity's budget would have
paled in comparison to the resources devoted to the more
established, and far-reaching Departments of Justice and the
Interior. Accordingly, this author would submit that the potential
for a proposed Trust Counsel Authority or cabinet level
Department of Indian Affairs to succeed as an independent
governmental agency seems debatable.
V. THIS AUTHOR'S PROPOSAL TO ALLEVIATE THE CONFLICT
OF INTEREST PROBLEM
93 See Part HI(C) of this Article, supra.
94 See Rice et al., supra note 1, at 375.
95 Both economic and human.
96 See Rice et al., supra note 1, at 375.
97 See id. (Noting that, while it is one thing to say, "[w]e're going to
handle this by hiring any number of lawyers," it is quite another thing to feel the
same way knowing that one is "going up against the entire Justice
Department.").
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The above being said, this author would suggest that one
solution to the Federal-Native American conflict of interest
dilemma lies in allowing Native Americans to litigate on their own
behalf, free of federal interference and direction.
For more than 150 years, Chief Justice Marshall's
paternalistic philosophy9" has placed federal interests in the first
priority and Native Americans in the second with respect to
Federal-Native American trust litigation tactics and objectives.
Thus, when Native American trust issues are involved, the best that
Native Americans can hope for is to be given adequate notice and a
full and fair opportunity to be heard (i.e., intervention) after their
representative, the federal government, has asserted litigation
supremacy.99 Yet, this author would ask, is it truly appropriate to
place Native Americans in the position of interventionist, when in
most cases litigation brought on their behalf concerns interests
unique to them? Clearly, the answer is no, and this being the case,
this auther would submit that Native Americans are both entitled
to,"° and fully capable of,"' litigating claims on their own behalf,
free of government interference and direction.
Specifically, such a proposal is not a call for greater Native
American intervention in litigation already spearheaded by the
federal government. 2 Rather, it is a call for an abatement of the
Federal-Native American trust relationship to the extent that, when
it is necessary to litigate claims associated with Native American
interests, Native Americans take the lead.
A. A Call for a Federal-Native American Litigation Trust Fund
98 See Part II of this Article, supra.
99 See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 144 n.16.
100 As a result of sovereignty considerations.
101 See Ralph W. Johnson, 1991 Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of
Canadian And United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REv. 643,
676-78 (1993) (discussing the historical development of legal representation for
Native Americans from the 1960's onward, and how such developments have
"had a significant impact on the achievement of Indian goals.").
102 After all, even intervention is ultimately controlled by the Secretary of
the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. See Zlock, supra note 69,
at 178 (citing 25 U.S.C.A §§ 81-82).
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Along these lines, this author would suggest that serious
consideration be given to the establishment of what this author
would term a Federal-Native American Litigation Trust Fund. In
essence, such a fund would be analogous to the federally funded,
and state distributed, block grants that are so commonplace
today. 3  The federal government would be responsible for
appropriations under the fund based on its Federal-Native
American trust responsibility, and Native Americans, perhaps
through a common entity such as the Native American Rights Fund
or the National Congress of American Indians, would be
empowered to litigate claims on their own behalf using trust fund
assets.
While progressive, such a plan would leave the Federal-
Native American trust relationship altered yet unbroken.
Furthermore, it would serve to strengthen Native American
sovereignty by allowing Native Americans to control their own
destiny. Most impoitantly, however, such a proposal would help
to alleviate the hazard posed by a relaxation in the federal
government's Native American trust responsibility-that is, the
inability of Native Americans to litigate claims on their own behalf
due to a lack of economic resources. Accordingly, this author
would submit that a Federal-Native American Litigation Trust
Fund would benefit all parties involved while serving to resolve
Nevada-like conflict of interest problems."4
B. The Capacity for Native American Self-Representation
With the above noted, there is every indication that Native
Americans are ready to take on such a leadership role.' °5 Indian
103 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 9901 et seq. See
also 45 C.F.R. § 96.1 (1999) (discussing block grant distribution requirements).
104 This author notes that such a remedy will most likely be viewed by
others as overly-simplistic, and perhaps idealistic. However, such a remedy is
in no way meant to be exclusive. Rather, this author's proposed remedy is
intended to serve as a catalyst for healthy debate on this important topic.
1o5 See Johnson, supra note 101, at 676-78.
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law can no longer be thought of as an "arcane, odd little field with
seminars of five to six people."10 6 Rather, today it is very much a
part of both federal and state law."0 7 For instance, it is readily
apparent that "the 1950s and 1960s produced a cadre of young,
capable lawyers ... some of whom became expert in the unique
field of Indian law."10 8 Furthermore, with law schools beginning to
teach federal Indian law in the late 1960s and early 1970s,'09 the
ability of Native Americans to litigate claims on their own behalf
appears to be self evident."' This being said, it seems obvious that
as Federal Indian law has developed, the dependency upon
government litigators has diminished. Thus, a modification of the
traditional Federal-Native American trust relationship appears to
be in order.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Federal-Native American trust relationship
embodies nearly 200 years of legal precedent, there is simply no
reason why such a relationship must be burdened with the ethical
dilemmas described above."' Rather, this author would suggest
that the Federal-Native American trust relationship is adaptable to
change. And, while the solutions promulgated by President
Nixon"2 and the American Indian Policy Review Commission" 3
provided a call to action with respect to such change, until the
paternalistic spirit of Marshallian thought"' is muted, it appears
106 Kevin Gover, "There is Hope": A Few Thoughts on Indian Law, 24
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 219, 219 (2000).
107 See id.
108 See Johnson, supra note 101, at 677.
109 See id. See also Gover, supra note 106, at 219.
110 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 101, at 678 n.177 (noting how the Native
American Rights Fund, established in 1968, employs roughly 20 attorneys and
is commonly involved in nearly 70 cases nationwide at any given time); and
Gover, supra note 106, pt 219 (stating that "[t]hirty years ago, there were less
than a dozen Indian people who were attorneys, and look at us now.").
III See Part II(B) of this Article, supra.
112 See Part IV(A) of this Article, supra.
113 See Part IV(B) of this Article, supra.
114 See Royster, supra note 18, at 330.
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unlikely that a solution to Nevada-like conflicts of interest"5 will
ever come to fruition.
This being said, it is this author's hope that the present
article serves as a wake up call to all parties involved that decisions
such as Nevada should not, and cannot, be tolerated. Sooner or
later, the guardian-ward relationship espoused by Chief Justice
Marshall" 6 must be modified in response to modem realities." 7
Nevertheless, until that day comes, "every nick, every cut, out of
the group of powers that have constituted tribal self-government,
tribal self determination, and tribal sovereignty over the years,
could very well become a feature that is permanently lost.""'
APPENDIX "All 119
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LANDS UNDER
JURISDICTION OF THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
AS OF DECEMBER 31,1997
Acreage Tribal Individually Total Government Total
RecaptulaUo Owned Trust Owned
n By State - I I I
Alabama 1,689.32 0.00 1,689.32 0.00 1,689.32
Alaska 87,031.59 1,074,567.44 1,161,599.03 0.00 1,161,599.0
3
Arizona 20,370,936.8 256,721.21 20,627,658.0 90,466.48 20,718,124.
5 6 54
California 520,349.96 71,527.40 591,877.36 152.74 592,030.10
Colorado 797,631.48 2,699.68 800,331.16 12.24 800,343.40
Connecticut 7,202.30 0.00 7,202.30 0.00 7,202.30
Florida 356,509.64 0.00 356,509.64 333.30 356,642.94
Idaho 373,338.50 193,885.39 567,223.89 21,749.64 588,973.53
Iowa 7,270.99 0.16 7,271.15 5.00 7,276.15
115 For this author's proposed solution, see Part V(A) of this Article,
supra.
116 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
117 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 101, at 676-78; and Gover, supra note
106, at 219. See also Appendix "A" of this Article, infra (tabulating tribal lands
under the jurisdiction of the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs).
118 Gover, supra note 106, at 221.
119 United States Department of the Interior Web-Page (visited April 1,
2000) <http://www.doi.gov/bia/realty/state97.html>.
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Kansas 10,149.34 23,277.52 33,426.86 36.00 33,462.86
Louisiana 3,353.77 0.00 3,353.77 0.00 3,353.77
Maine 290,836.81 0.00 290,836.81 0.00 290,836.81
Massachus 473.90 0.00 473.90 0.00 473.90
etts
Michigan 16,385.08 9,268.55 25,653.63 0.00 25,653.63
Minnesota 980,556.45 49,958.50 1,030,514.95 88.05 1,030,603.0
0
Mississippi 26,478.88 0.00 26,478.88 30.00 26,508.88
Missouri 0.00 374.37 374.37 0.00 374.37
Montana 2,641,958.45 2,856,797.73 5,498,756.18 3,778.85 5,502,535.0
3
Nebraska 23,366.00 43,248.21 66,614.21 6.79 66,621.00
Nevada 1,148,095.42 78,528.56 1,226,623.98 4,978.71 1,231,602.6
9
New Mexico 7,590,374.03 668,839.71 8,259,213.74 179,739.96 8,438,953.7
0
New York 88,529.40 0.00 88,529.40 0.00 88,529.40
North 57,246.34 0.00 57,246.34 0.00 57,246.34
Carolina
North 246,843.74 617,888.07 864,731.81 1,927.71 866,659.52
Dakota
Oklahoma 104,731.12 951,512.60 1,056,243.72 849.88 1,057,093.6
0
Oregon 654,063.17 128,187.90 782,251.07 423.40 782,674.47
Rhode 2,342.22 0.00 2,342.22 0.00 2,342.22
Island
South 1,414.00 0.00 1,414.00 0.00 1,414.00
Carolina
South 2,621,806.58 2,382,304.31 5,004,110.89 2,645.45 5,006,756.3
Dakota 4
Tennessee 168.04 0.00 168.04 0.00 168.04
Texas 5,361.95 0.00 5,361.95 0.00 5,361.95
Utah 2,297,637.85 33,236.69 2,330,874.54 87.45 2,330,961.9
1_ 9
Washington 2,196,818.20 440,332.42 2,637,150.62 160.08 2,637,310.7
0
Wisconsin 352,620.51 82,444.21 435,064.72 350.71 435,415.43
Wyoming 1,794,589.22 93,690.11 1,888,279.33 1,296.15 1,889,575.4
8
TOTAL 45,678,161.1 10,059,290.7 55,737,456.8 309,189.19 56,046,641.
_ , 0 4 5 03
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